Volume 10, Issue 36 (6-2019)                   jemr 2019, 10(36): 127-162 | Back to browse issues page


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Khodavaisi H, Golkhandan A, Babaei Agh Esmaili M. The Impact of Corruption on Military Burden in Selected Developing Countries. jemr 2019; 10 (36) :127-162
URL: http://jemr.khu.ac.ir/article-1-1764-en.html
1- Urmia University , h.khodavaisi@gmail.com
2- Lorestan University
3- Urmia University
Abstract:   (4264 Views)
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of corruption on the military burden of developing countries during the 2000-2015 period. To achieve this goal, a general model of military expenditures , two indexes of corruption including corruption perceptions and control of corruption, Panel Co-integration analysis and two-stage system generalized method of moment estimator (SGMM), has been used. The results of the estimation of the research model show that the effect of corruption on the military burden of the studied countries is positive and significant. According to other results, civilian spending (as an opportunity cost of military spending) and democracy have had a negative and significant impact on the military burden of developing countries. . Population as a social variable has a positive and significant effect on the military burden of developing countries, which indicates that defense is a public good. Per capita income and lagged military expenditure also have a positive and significant effect on the military burden of the studied countries. The average military burden of the countries of the world has also had a positive and significant impact on the military burden of developing countries, which indicates a rivalry of arms.
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Type of Study: Applicable | Subject: سایر
Received: 2018/10/16 | Accepted: 2019/07/9 | Published: 2019/09/24

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